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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code § 78-2a-3(h) (1996) as this is an appeal from an order entered in a domestic
relations case.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
FIRST ISSUE: Appellant/Respondent's (hereinafter Mr. Betteridge) First Issue
claims the trial court abused its discretion in finding that cohabitation did not exist. This
First Issue is a mixture of law and fact. The trial court found as facts that no common
residence had been established and that no sexual conduct evidencing a conjugal
relationship had been established. Based upon those findings, the trial court reached the
legal conclusion that cohabitation did not exist so as to terminate the alimony Mr.
Betteridge was ordered to pay to Appellee/Petitioner (hereinafter Ms. Betteridge).
SECOND, THIRD AND FOURTH ISSUES: Mr. Betteridge's Second, Third,
and Fourth Issues claim "abuse of discretion" by the trial court when, after reaching the
conclusion that cohabitation did not exist so as to terminate the alimony order, the trial
court found Mr. Betteridge in contempt of the Order of the court, granted Ms. Betteridge
a judgment for alimony arrearages, and awarded Ms. Betteridge the attorneys fees and
costs incurred in defending against the cohabitation claim.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The determination of whether given circumstances constitute cohabitation require
the application of the terms of a court order to a given set of facts. The process is in
1

reality a mixed question of fact and law . . ." Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 671
Utah 1985); Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160 (Ut. App. 1996).

When

challenging the adequacy of the trial court's findings of fact that no common residence
was established and that no sexual conduct evidencing a conjugal relationship had been
established the appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support
as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous.
Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44, \ 10 n. 5; 19 P.3d 1005, 1008; see also Sigg
v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 913 n. 7 (Ut. App. 1995)
A "clear abuse of discretion" standard of review applies to the trial court's
conclusion of law that the elements of cohabitation had not been proven so as to trigger
the statutory termination of alimony, and its orders finding Mr. Betteridge in contempt of
an Order of the court, Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238, 240 (Utah 1976);
Marsh v. Marsh, 1999 UT App 14, f 8; 973 P.2d 988, 990, granting Ms. Betteridge a
judgment for alimony arrearages, and awarding Ms. Betteridge her attorneys fees and
costs incurred in defending against the cohabitation claim. Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App
012, 1 33; 973 P.2d 431, 439; Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1030, n. 4 (Ut. App.
1992); see also Utah Code § 30-3-3 (1998).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal seeks review of the finding of the trial court that cohabitation did not
exist so as to terminate the order of alimony contained within the original Decree of
Divorce. Mr. Betteridge also challenges the trial court's order holding him in contempt
of the Order of the court requiring the payment of alimony, the trial court's entry of
judgment against Mr. Betteridge for delinquent alimony payments, and the awarding of
the attorneys fees and costs incurred by Ms. Betteridge in seeking the enforcement of the
Order of the court.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is the second appeal filed by Mr. Betteridge to orders entered by the trial
court in the case, this court having previously affirmed the Decree of Divorce. (Utah
Court of Appeals, No. 20030065; non-published opinion).
The Decree of Divorce [Rec. 237-240] was entered on December 23, 2002,
pursuant to the trial to the court on September 27, 2002, and its ruling on October 8,
2002. The Decree contained a judgment for alimony at $1,600 per month in favor of Ms.
Betteridge for the period commencing February, 2002 through October, 2002, and
ordered continuing alimony at $1,600 per month to be paid by Mr. Betteridge to Ms.
Betteridge for no longer than the duration of the marriage (25 years) or until otherwise
terminated by law.

3

Mr. Betteridge refused to pay the judgment for alimony as granted in the Decree
of Divorce ana ,,, January, 2003 u v..
sen ^d i ipc

continuing Garnishment was issued and

- Betteridge's emploj er to effect collection of the judgment awarded in

the Decree of Divorce. [Rec. 342-363]
Mr. Betteridge also refusec ;, , ^ -he ongoing alimony as ordered by the court
and an Orri- •* S!-~- ''-•- • '• •• ' ' *tf-mr>t \Y;K J:;=: :! - r:inua:\ ^ ™ ,lJ
293],

r

P;v ?^2~

hearing before the Domestic Commissioner on January M). J003 the

Commissioner certified to the

.. for an evidentiary hearing the issue u

Betteridge's contempt and recommended entry of judgment for alimony arrearages which
had accrued for November, 2002 through the date of hearing. [Rec. 335-338] The Order
and Judgment was entered June _;\ .

. ;.JC. :vo ? OJ

A Notice of Appeal was filed on July 21. 2XJ<JJ. The case was selected for
mediation, but was not resolved. The court ordered Mr Betteridge io file his brief by
May 12, 2004. A stip ulated exte tisioii • :: f tin ic w as grants.. . > jane _.

......

"lodged" with the court on June 2, 2004, with a subsequent, significantly changed brief
"filed" with the court on June 9, 2004.
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
The evidentiary hearing on the issue of Mr. Betteridge's contempt was heard by
the trial court on February l1'. _v. • :i ,

. ^ ^; * .>ruu. • J<v JUlo [KCC, - w: ai a a

subsequent evident! a
Betteridge's claim that he should not be held in contempt for failing to pay alimony on
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the grounds that he did not have the ability to pay.

[Note:

All volumes of the

transcripts of hearing will be hereinafter referred to as "Tr." followed by the page
number and line of the transcript]
The court received items into evidence and heard the testimony of Ms. Betteridge
[Tr. 7-19; 233-259], a former co-worker of Ms. Betteridge [Tr. 20-66], two of the
children of Mr. and Mrs. Betteridge [Tr. 67-78; 79-86], the individual to whom Ms.
Betteridge rented a room in her apartment [Tr. 86-109], three neighbors of Ms. Betteridge
[Tr. 121-150; 150-163; 205-212], Mr. Betteridge [Tr. 213-217], Mr. Betteridge's sister
[Tr. 163-185], and Ms. Betteridge's father, mother and sister [Tr. 185-195; 196-205; 218233].
The court stated its understanding of the requirements of the law, its findings of
fact, its application of the law to the facts, and its conclusion that the elements had not
been met and that cohabitation was not found to exist. [Tr. 296: 18-25; 297: 1-17]
Subsequent to its finding that cohabitation did not exist, the court proceeded to
find Mr. Betteridge in contempt but accepted Mr. Betteridge's argument that he relied
upon cohabitation as the reason why he did not pay alimony. Because the court found a
good faith basis for Mr. Betteridge's non-payment, he directed counsel to propose a
means by which Mr. Betteridge would bring his obligations into complete compliance
rather than be subject to sanctions for deliberate avoidance of his alimony obligation.
[Tr. 300: 4-20]
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Because the court found that Ms. Betteridge had prevailed in her proceeding to
enforce the order of the court and defend against the cohabitation case, she was entitled to
and was awarded reasonable attorney's fees. FTr. 300: 21-24]
At the evidentiary hearing held June 13, 2003 [R. 831] and after receiving items
into evidence and hearing the testimony of Mr. Betteridge

; , a.e court stated its

finding that f\ ir Betteridge wa s aware of the order of the Court: requiri ng payment of
$1,600 per month in alimony, that he had the ability to pay as ordered, and that he refused
to pay as ordered. |

»-4:JJ--:

.^

.;c court further stated that it was struggling

to find that Mr. Betteridge could pay more than $1,600 per month and thus might not
have the ability to pay on the accrued arrearages, and that the only payments previously
made by Mr. Betteridge were the payments made as a result of the garnishments. [ I i , 85:
10-22]
The court did not award Ms. Betteridge attorney fees for the hearing on June 13,
2 A . oecause

. ^ilendgc * Iluancial loiidiliuii mi Il iiulai liul NIL uuiul vwis

offering him some relief by limiting the amount he was required to pay per month to
$1,600.00 [Tr. 87; 4-10] and ordered that Mr. Betteridge could purge himself of the
coiitempl In Jibiiliii III Hi

ml

iiillli i Inr [tinmen! oi '(.SUiniiiil pi i pj>dk\l' b I I

Betteridge. [Tr. 93: 5-23; R. 593-596]
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RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATION TO THE RECORD
The court recited the factors upon which its decision was based and the reasoning
in which the court engaged in arriving at its conclusion. [Tr. 297:17-25; 298; 299; 300:
1-4]
1. Certain of Mr. Betteridge's Statement of Facts at pp. 3-7 of his brief and
identified below mischaracterize the testimony in the attempt to mislead the Court:
a. Statement of Fact 1 states "Ms. Betteridge had another man . . . living in
her apartment." Tr. 8:4-12. In answer to the question posed at Tr. 8:4-12: "Since
you've been living in that apartment in Midvale, has anyone else lived there with
you?" Ms. Betteridge answered: "For a short time I had rented a room because I
needed the extra income because I was receiving nothing from my ex-husband".
b. Statement of Fact 2 states "Ms. Betteridge admitted Mr. Reinen spent
the night in her apartment from October, 2002 to mid-January, 2003." Tr. 8:17-20;
9:1-2. The question posed at Tr. 8:17 was "And when did he move in?" Ms.
Betteridge answered: "Under the circumstances he started renting the room from
me the beginning of October . . . 2002." Similarly, Mr. Reinen's testimony was
that he didn't spend the night in the apartment until he moved in as a roommate to
help her pay her rent. Tr. 87:12-16.
c. Statement of Fact 5 states "Mr. Reinen testified Ms. Betteridge left a
key under the mat so he could access the apartment when Ms. Betteridge was not
at home." Tr. 88:16-22. Mr. Reinen's testimony actually states: "Well, when I
was staying there there was times where she would leave the key under the mat so
7

I would be able to get in. That was very rare,

A most of my time at my

A

house." I i .88:20-22.
d. Stateme '
from

Ms.

;

*

i s "Is li R einen testified he primarih

Betteridge's apartment because -H

termination of alimony".

:

*e litigation involving the

Il i i'iK::> 11, Mi. . omen's testimony actually states:

"Wei 1 ! i lostlj bee m use of this stuff that's haprur
apartment, so it wasn't so crov .. *

^v- . v>rh u-

/

J

'^

. Well, just because, you know, I didn't want

to cause any waves between an\body. ^u. you know... I was just, you know
88:5

*

-

r

•- •, ?»,. .- -v . ; ;\<: • *:

.\ A i; - in * .irrnn^prv-M-;

in his own apartment and the circumstances allowing him to move back to his own
apartment in mid-January. I i 9 9:10 25; 100:1 23; 101 ; I ;
e. Statement of Fact 24 states "Ms. Betteridge's counsel admitted that his
client had testified at the original divorce trial she had engaged in an extramarital
affai

rhis exchange was part of closing argument to the court in

response

f

opposing counsel's argument that the court: should presume •'••.•

existence of sexual conduct because of testimony given at trial
li-L

..

^L_;

....

I-JwUiiJCLK.-i.

. . . . . .

.J'„;*K!ik\

..

....

_

. . , _

I r 266: I 7 -21.
i:

dhC

[ilea / . ; .

determination that fault would not influence the judgment in granting the divorce.
Tr. 271:25; 272:1-14. Including this reference in the Statement of Facts in simply
an attempt to reai gue 1"\ ft: Betteridge' s position inth z ti la 1 cc in it.
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\

2. Examples of evidence in the record in addition to those identified by Mr.
Betteridge which support the findings of the trial court and which were not marshaled by
Mr. Betteridge include:
a. Jonnathen was residing temporarily in the apartment of Ms. Betteridge.
i)

Testimony of Arthur Milne at Tr. 190:21-25; 191:4-8;

ii)

Witness Corby Bray at Tr. 222:18-25; 223; 232:14-25; 233:
3-10;

iii)

Witness Gwen Milne at Tr. 199:3-12; 200: 6-15

iv)

Witness Brent A. Betteridge at Tr. 82:3-6;

v)

Witness Aaron McTee at Tr. 149:2-25;

vi)

Witness Sherry Shepherd at Tr. 207:10-25; 208; 209:1-16;

b. Jonnathen did not have a key to Ms. Betteridge's apartment.
i)

Witness Corby Bray at Tr. 232:14-25; 233:3-10;

ii)

Witness Aisha Shavazz at Tr. 154:10-14; 158:3-9.

c. Jonnathen was not in Ms. Betteridge's apartment when Ms. Betteridge
wasn't, except on rare occasions, and Jonnathen did not have the intention or
practice to be in the apartment when she wasn't there,
i)

Witness Aisha Shavazz at Tr. 161:18-20;

ii)

Witness Gwyn Milne at Tr. 205:3-8.

d. Some kind of romantic interest or relationship clearly exists based on
pictures, gifts, kissing, attention, but that alone does not establish sexual conduct
evidencing a conjugal association.
9

i)

Witness Arthur Milne at Ti 18S 6-25; .

ii)

Witness Owen Mime

iii)

Witness Shawn Betteridge at I r. 69:11-25; 70; 72: 77:10-25;
78:1-6 : .

^

Witness Brent A. Bettridge at ;. -> ,.-t 5. ^ : „ ~ ~ : . ^..> . l-

v)

vViinc^ VaronMcTee > i- •"

1 :

->- 12*5:2-20. •

3. Mr. Betteridge's Brief was "lodged" with the clerk of the above entitled court
on June 2,

. . ^euenuge s unci containing significant changes wa* :. .

with the clerk of above entitled court on June 9, 2004.
Significant substantive differences exist in the Brief "lodged" on June 2, 2004
andthe .>.iw. - ^

r.ii. ;..

.. >JI;-\.S:

a. Paragraph entitled "Statement of Facts" in June 2, 2004 Brief at pp. 4-5
compared to June 9. 2004 Brief at pp. 3-7;
b, Argumei..

,

_/•>

. „:.ipai ed to June 9, 200 ;:l

,

Brief at pp. 9-12;
gument II in June 2, 2004 Brief at p. ° compared to June 95 2004
Unci ..ill I

I II.

•-..-• • . /

-.-...

.. : ; : . , ..-•

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Trial Court's findings that the elements of cohabitation were not proven are

He is required to present in comprehensive and fastidious order every scrap of competent
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evidence introduced at trial which supports the finding that there was no common
residence for Ms. Betteridge and Jonnathen Reinen, and that there was no sexual conduct
which was conjugal in nature. Mr. Betteridge cites to only some of the testimony of Ms.
Betteridge and Mr. Reinen, fails to cite to any of the testimony of the 11 other witnesses,
and simply re-argues his position that simply because Mr. Reinen paid rent it must be
deemed admitted that Ms. Betteridge's apartment became a common residence. The
testimony that the arrangement was temporary and in fact terminated after 3-1/2 months
is disregarded, and the testimony regarding the restricted use of and access to the
apartment is disregarded.

With respect to sexual conduct evidencing a conjugal

relationship, Mr. Betteridge points out testimony regarding a photo displayed, gifts
exchanged at Christmas, kissing and attention paid in public and merely reargues his
position at trial that the court must conclude that sexual conduct existed. No argument is
advanced regarding the need for establishing the existence of a conjugal relationship of
which the sexual conduct was a part.

Having failed to marshal the evidence, Mr.

Betteridge further fails to meet his burden of demonstrating that despite this evidence, the
trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the
evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous.
No Abuse of Discretion is Shown. In failing to meet his burden of demonstrating
that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous, the fact that no cohabitation existed
must be accepted as true. If no cohabitation exists, the statutory provisions of Utah Code
§30-3-5(9) (1998) that terminate alimony upon a finding of cohabitation are not
applicable and Mr. Betteridge's argument that the trial court abused its discretion in
11

holding Mr. Betteridge in contempt for failing to abide by the order of the court, entering
a judgment for alimony arrearages, and awarding Ms. Betteridge her attorney fees and
costs incurred, must fail. It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to make
findings of contempt, impose sanctions punishing contempt, award judgments for
arrearages in court ordered payments, and award attorney fees and costs to the prevailing
party.
Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal. Ms. Betteridge prevailed below and was
awarded attorney fees and costs, and should be awarded her attorney fees and costs
incurred in defending this appeal. Mr. Betteridge fails to make a good faith argument
that the trial court's finding that no cohabitation existed was clearly erroneous. He
merely reargues the case he made to the trial court.
Mr. Betteridge should be Sanctioned for Bringing a Frivolous Appeal and For
Disregard of the Court's Rule. Mr. Betteridge failed to marshal the evidence to meet his
burden of showing that the findings were clearly erroneous. He simply disagrees with the
trial court's assessment of the weight of the evidence. There is no reasonable legal or
factual basis for this appeal. The history of this case demonstrates that Mr. Betteridge
has engaged in repeated appeals and has persistently refused to obey the order of the
court regarding payment of alimony. The only alimony collected from Mr. Betteridge
has been through garnishment or court ordered deduction from his paycheck.

Ms.

Betteridge has been required to incur significant legal fees in the enforcement of her
rights and entitlements as awarded by the court. Significant court resources have been
expended as a result of Mr. Betteridge's refusal to abide by the order of the court.
12

Further, Mr. Betteridge has abused the Rules of Appellate Procedure in the manner in
which his brief on this appeal was filed, and within the filed brief, has obfuscated and
mischaracterized the issues in attempt to mislead the court and provide legitimacy to his
appeal.
ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS.

In challenging the adequacy of the findings made by the trial court, Mr. Betteridge
must show that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey,
2001 UT App 44 t 10 n. 5, 19 P.3d 1005, 1008; Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 913 (Utah
App. 1995). He must do more than merely reargue facts supporting his position. Sigg, at
913, n. 7. He is required to present in comprehensive and fastidious order every scrap of
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the finding that there was no
common residence for Ms. Betteridge and Jonnathen Reinen, and that there was no
sexual conduct which was conjugal in nature.

The appellate court will review the

evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings. Id. at 910, n. 2. Then he is
obliged to demonstrate that despite that evidence the court's findings are so lacking in
support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence thus making them clearly
erroneous. Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App at^j 10, n. 5.
Mr. Betteridge has failed to adequately marshal the evidence supporting the trial
court's findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence the findings are so
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lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them
clearly erroneous.
A.

Elements of Cohabitation.

"Cohabitation is comprised of the same two elements: (1) common residency and
(2) sexual contact evidencing a conjugal association." Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d
669, 672 (Utah 1985); Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah App. 1996).
Both elements must be established by a preponderance of the evidence in order to arrive
at the conclusion that cohabitation exists. In his attempt to marshal the evidence
pertaining to these two elements Mr. Betteridge identifies only some of the testimony of
Ms. Betteridge and Mr. Reinen, fails to cite to any of the testimony of the 11 other
witnesses, and simply re-argues his position at trial.
B.

Common Residency.

Mr. Betteridge argues that Mr. Reinen paid rent so it must be deemed admitted by
this fact alone, that Ms. Betteridge's apartment became a common residence.

This

argument disregards the factual analysis required in Utah upon which a finding of
common residency must be based. The Utah Supreme Court requires a showing by a
preponderance of the evidence of a sharing of a common abode that both parties consider
their principal domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of time. Haddow, 101
P.2d at 672. The holding in Haddow was applied to the facts in Pendleton, 918 P.2d at
160 when the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's finding on the element of
common residency. The determinative factors applied in Pendleton centered upon the
14

nature of the use of and access to the premises, and were whether the other party had a
key and could come and go as he pleased and whether he regularly spent time in the
premises in the absence of the other and was not merely a guest. The facts in Pendleton
included possession of a key, and a practice of coming and going from the residence
regardless of the presence of the other. Id.
Here, the trial court, having heard all of the testimony of all of the
witnesses, stated
I found more than credible the testimony that the young man,
Jonnathen, was basically engaged in residing temporarily in
the apartment of Ms. Betteridge as essentially an overflow
area because of the extreme crowded conditions of his own
apartment. I'm not satisfied from the evidence that that ever
became his principal domicile.
I'm persuaded after asking questions searchingly and hearing
the testimony searchingly that he never had a key. That he
was not over there except on rare occasions when Ms.
Betteridge wasn't. That that wasn't part of the relationship
that they had. That she basically didn't want him there when
she wasn't there, and that wasn't his intention or practice to
do so.
In addition to that, it wouldn't appear to this Court that there
was an established ongoing relationship. This was something
that was temporary. I don't think the evidence establishes
anything to the contrary.
I don't have the impression that Jonnathen came and went,
but rather he'd go there for the night, but wasn't the sort of
thing where that was kind of the place he really hung out
most of the time.
It's clear that Ms. Betteridge and Jonnathen ate meals
together from time to time. That they went out together.
There's some dispute as to how much, but to me the evidence
on that again doesn't establish this practice that they ate
almost all meals together.

15

There was clearly no financial comingling. In short, it seems
to me that even though there was certainly a credible case
presented, and I recognize that Mr. Betteridge's case had a
code argument, it wasn't frivolous, that still that the burden
was not met to establish common residency.
[Tr. 297:23-25; 298; 299:1-3]
Mr. Betteridge has failed to marshal all of the evidence that the arrangement was
temporary and in fact terminated after 3-1/2 months, and all of the evidence regarding
Jonnathen's restricted use of and access to the apartment. Further, he fails to demonstrate
how all of the evidence so marshaled fails to support the trial court's finding that the
arrangement was temporary and that no common residency existed. It is well established
that the lower court's finding of fact will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing that
it is clearly erroneous.

Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44 at \ 10 n. 5; Kessimakis v.

Kessimakis, 1999 UT App 130, If 8; 977 P.2d 1226, 1228; Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App
12, U 24; 973 P.2d 431,436-7.
C.

Sexual Conduct Evidencing a Conjugal Association.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that sexual contact in the cohabitation context
means "participation in a relatively permanent sexual relationship akin to that generally
existing between husband and wife." Haddow, 101 P.2d at 672. See also, Knuteson v.
Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Utah 1980). In the Haddow opinion, the court evaluated
the nature and extent of sexual contact between the parties and noted that the parties had
been dating exclusively for about fourteen months, had engaged in the practice of
spending the night together at lease once a week, had vacationed together to Hawaii and
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had stayed the night together in Elko, Nevada during that period of time. The trial court's
finding of cohabitation was reversed by the Supreme Court holding that while the facts
established the presence of a relatively permanent sexual relationship, common residency
had not been established. Id.
Here, the trial court, having heard all of the testimony of all of the witnesses,
stated
Likewise on the issue of sexual conduct evidencing a
conjugal association, there was certainly no direct evidence of
any sexual conduct. That was denied vehemently by
Jonnathen and Ms. Betteridge. That's something that was not
something either one admitted to.
The evidence we had came from Mr. Lee who, to say the
least, presented to this Court a person who seemed to be
disturbed and have some kind of an obsessive relationship
with Ms. Betteridge that clouded his credibility in the Court's
mind, and certainly made what he had to say something less
than completely believable.
The best that he had to say was, you know, lights were going
off and on, as Ms. Woresewaren's testified, but you know,
Ms. Worsewaren's testimony had to do with one evening,
observing until 11 o'clock at night. That doesn't seem to me
to make a case for sexual contact, nor does Mr. Lee's
observations of that, in the face of the parties denying it and
no credible testimony otherwise coming to this Court's
attention.
There's clearly some kind of a romantic interest or
relationship. There were the pictures, the gifts, the kissing,
the attention and all of that, but I'm just not persuaded that
that alone establishes sexual conduct evidencing a conjugal
association. To draw that leap seems to me to be unfounded,
and I don't believe the evidence supports it.
[Tr. 299:4-25; 300:1-3]
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Mr. Betteridge has failed to marshal the evidence that a relatively permanent
sexual relationship akin to that generally existing between husband and wife existed
between Ms. Betteridge and Mr. Reinen. Further, he fails to demonstrate how all of the
evidence fails to support the trial court's finding that no such relatively permanent sexual
relationship akin to that generally existing between husband and wife was proven. In the
absence of a showing that it is clearly erroneous the lower court's finding of fact should
not be disturbed on appeal. Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44 at \ 10 n. 5; Kessimakis, 1999
UT App 130 at f 8; Moon, 1999 Ut. App 12 at \ 24.
Having failed to marshal the evidence and demonstrate that the findings of the trial
court on each of the required elements constituting cohabitation are clearly erroneous, the
order and judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
II.

NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

The sound exercise of discretion requires the trial court to correctly apply the law
to the facts. Unlike the trial court in Garcia v. Garcia, 2002 UT App 381ffl[6, 7, 8; 60
P.3d 1174, 1175-1176, there is no assertion here that the provisions of Utah Code § 30-35(9) were incorrectly interpreted.
A.

Conclusion that Alimony Did Not Terminate.

Mr. Betteridge's failure to meet his burden of demonstrating that the trial court's
findings are clearly erroneous means that the fact that no cohabitation existed must be
accepted as true. Moon, 1999 UT App 12 at \ 24.

Accordingly, if no cohabitation

exists, the statutory provisions of Utah Code § 30-3-5(9) that terminate alimony upon a
finding of cohabitation are not triggered.
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After making its determination that

cohabitation did not exist, the trial court did not abuse is discretion in concluding that the
provisions of Utah Code § 30-3-5(9) did not apply.
B.

Finding of Contempt.

It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to make findings of contempt and
impose sanctions punishing contempt. Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238, 240
(Utah 1976); Marsh v. Marsh, 1999 UT App 14, If 8; 973 P.2d 988, 990.
Mr. Betteridge argues that the trial court abused its discretion in holding Mr.
Betteridge in contempt for failing to abide by the order of the court, for the sole reason
that it erred in failing to find cohabitation thus triggering the termination provisions of
Utah Code § 30-3-5(9). Mr. Betteridge advances a theory based upon nunc pro tunc
powers or the equitable remedy of void ab initio that by asserting a defense of
cohabitation against a motion for enforcement of a court order requiring payment of
alimony, he should not be found in contempt even when the cohabitation claim fails. The
plain wording of the statute is not in dispute that alimony terminates when the
cohabitation commenced. But if cohabitation is not proven to exist then alimony does
not terminate. Raising the defense of cohabitation, even in good faith, would not
immunize the delinquent alimony obligor from the contemptuous behavior. A finding of
contempt is within the sound discretion of the court when it appears that the obligor knew
of the existence of the order requiring him to pay, that the obligor had the ability to pay,
and that the obligor refused to pay. Mr. Betteridge makes no argument that the court's
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action is so unreasonable as to be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse
of discretion.
In this case the trial court found on undisputed facts that Mr. Betteridge knew of
the existence of the order requiring him to pay, that Mr. Betteridge had the ability to pay,
and that Mr. Betteridge refused to pay. [Rec. 831; Tr. p. 85:3-10]. However, the trial
court further exercised its discretion in recognizing Mr. Betteridge9s claim of
cohabitation as a reason for not payment in the trial court's choice of sanctions for the
contempt, and ordered that Mr. Betteridge could purge himself of the contempt by paying
$800.00 per paycheck to Ms. Betteridge. [Rec. 831; Tr. p. 93:3-18; Rec. 593-596]
Mr. Betteridge's failure to meet his burden of demonstrating that the trial court's
findings are clearly erroneous means that the fact that no cohabitation existed must be
accepted as true. Moon, 1999 UT App 12 at U 24.

Accordingly, if no cohabitation

exists, the statutory provisions of Utah Code § 30-3-5(9) that terminate alimony upon a
finding of cohabitation are not triggered. The order of the trial court finding contempt
should be affirmed.
C.

Entering a judgment for alimony arrearages.

It is within the sound discretion of the court to enter a judgment for unpaid
alimony. Mr. Betteridge's only dispute with the entry of the judgment against him for
alimony arrears which accruedfromNovember, 2002 through June, 2003 is his insistence
that the trial court was wrong in finding no cohabitation and thus alimony should have
terminated as a matter of law.
20

Mr. Betteridge's failure to meet his burden of demonstrating that the trial court's
findings are clearly erroneous means that the fact that no cohabitation existed must be
accepted as true. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, ^f 24.

Accordingly, if no cohabitation exists,

the statutory provisions of Utah Code § 30-3-5(9) that terminate alimony upon a finding
of cohabitation are not triggered. The alimony accrued and was not paid and the order of
the trial court entering judgment for the alimony arrearages should be affirmed.
D.

Award of attorney fees and costs to Ms. Betteridge.

In an action to enforce the provisions of a divorce decree an award of attorney fees
is based solely upon the trial court's discretion, regardless of the financial need of the
moving party. Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1030, n. 4. (Utah App. 1992). Mr.
Betteridge's only dispute with the award of attorney fees and costs to Ms. Betteridge
[Rec. 588-590] is that his insistence that she should not have been the prevailing party.
Mr. Betteridge's failure to meet his burden of demonstrating that the trial court's
findings are clearly erroneous means that the fact that no cohabitation existed must be
accepted as true. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, f 24.

Accordingly, if no cohabitation exists,

the statutory provisions of Utah Code § 30-3-5(9) that terminate alimony upon a finding
of cohabitation are not triggered. The order of the trial court awarding attorney fees and
costs should be affirmed.
m.

AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Ms. Betteridge prevailed against the defense of cohabitation below and was
awarded her attorney fees and costs and should be awarded her attorney fees and costs
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incurred in defending this appeal. Moon, 1999 UT App 012 f 33; Lyngle, 831 P.2d at
1031, n. 4. Mr. Betteridge failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the trial court's
findings are clearly erroneous. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, f 24. He merely reargues the
case he made to the trial court.
IV.

A.

MR. BETTERIDGE SHOULD BE SANCTIONED FOR BRINGING
A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL AND FOR ABUSE OF THE COURT'S
RULES

Frivolous Appeal.

Mr. Betteridge failed to marshal the evidence and failed to meet his burden of
demonstrating that despite that evidence the court's findings are so lacking in support as
to be against the clear weight of the evidence thus making them clearly erroneous.
Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44, f 10, n. 5. Mr. Betteridge simply disagrees with the trial
court's assessment of the weight and import of the evidence. There was no reasonable
legal or factual basis for this appeal. Backstrom Family Ltd. P'ship v. Hall, 751 P.2d
1157,1160 (Ut. App. 1988).
The history of this case as shown in the Record on Appeal demonstrates that Mr.
Betteridge has engaged in repeated appeals and has persistently refused to obey the order
of the court regarding payment of alimony.

The only alimony collected from Mr.

Betteridge has been through garnishment or court ordered deduction from his paycheck.
His refusal to pay resulted in considerable financial hardship to Ms. Betteridge and she
has been required to incur significant legal fees in seeking the enforcement of her rights
and entitlements as awarded by the court.
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Significant court resources have been

expended as a result of Mr. Betteridge's refusal to abide by the order of the court. Mr.
Betteridge's course of conduct is similar to that observed by this court in Porco v. Porco,
752 P.2d 365 (Utah App. 1988) and similar relief should be awarded to Ms. Betteridge.
B.

Abuse of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Mr. Betteridge has abused the Rules of Appellate Procedure in the manner in
which his brief on this appeal was filed, and within the filed brief, has obfuscated and
mischaracterized the issues in an attempt to mislead the court and provide legitimacy to
his appeal.
Rule 24, Rules of Appellate Procedure, which proscribes the form of briefs such as
paper size, margins, typeface, binding, color of cover, and contents of cover, provides
that the clerk may reject a brief which is not prepared in accordance with the rules and
the party may have five (5) days to bring the brief into compliance with the rules. The
rule is not intended to permit significant substantive changes in briefs. Rule 24(e)
A comparison of the brief "lodged" with the court on June 2, 2004 with the brief
"filed" on June 9, 2004 shows significant substantive changes in the section entitled
"Statement of Facts". The June 2, 2004 brief contains 11 statements at pp. 4-5, none of
which reference the location in the Record or Transcript, compared with 27 statements of
fact in the June 9, 2004 brief at pp. 3-7. Further significant substantive changes appear in
Argument I on pp. 6-7 of the June 2,2004 brief when compared to pp. 9-13 in the June 9,
2004 brief; and significant substantive changes appear in Argument II on p. 9 of the June
2, 2004 brief when compared to p. 14 of the June 9, 2004 brief.
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Further, in Statement of Facts 1, 2, 5, 23, and 24 contained in the June 9, 2004
brief Mr. Betteridge has obfuscated and mischaracterized the facts and issues in an
attempt to mislead the court and provide legitimacy to his appeal.
Appropriate sanctions should be imposed against Mr. Betteridge for filing a
frivolous appeal and for abuse of the rules of appellate procedure.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's findings of fact that there was no common residency and no
sexual conduct evidencing a conjugal association should be affirmed. The trial court's
conclusion of law that no cohabitation existed should be affirmed. The order of the trial
court finding Mr. Betteridge in contempt should be affirmed. The order of the trial court
granting Ms. Betteridge judgment for alimony arrearages and awarding her attorneys fees
and costs should be affirmed.
Ms. Betteridge should be awarded her attorney fees and costs incurred in this
appeal.
Mr. Betteridge should be sanctioned for abusing the court process and for filing a
frivolous appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of July, 2004.
RICHMAN RICHMAN & JOHNSEN, LLC
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BARBARA W. RICHMAN
GLEN M. RICHMAN
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee

24

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 12th day of July, 2004,1 caused two true and correct
copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLEE to be mailed via first class,
postage prepaid to:
LISA A. READING
SCALLEY & READING, P.C.
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellant
50 South Main Street, Suite 950
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

25

